Safety is the starting point, not the trump card: Lawrence & Stephanidi [2026] FedCFamC1A 115

The 2024 amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 placed a renewed emphasis on safety when determining what parenting arrangements are in a child’s best interests.

But does that mean safety is now the overriding consideration?

In Lawrence & Stephanidi [2026] FedCFamC1A 115, the Full Court has made clear that it is not.

The decision also provides an important reminder about the limits of the Court’s power to impose mandatory therapy on parents and the dangers of self-executing parenting orders.

What happened?

The proceedings concerned two young children and involved allegations of family violence, concerns about both parents, an international relocation proposal and ongoing parenting proceedings.

The primary judge made findings that the father had perpetrated family violence against the mother. However, the Court did not ultimately find that either parent posed an unacceptable risk to the children.

The mother was unsuccessful in her application to relocate with the children to the United States.

A series of interim parenting orders were also made. Those orders required the mother to undertake psychological therapy, including treatment intended to assist her to accept the Court’s finding that the father did not present an unacceptable risk to the children’s safety.

Importantly, the orders went considerably further.

If the mother failed to comply with the therapy orders, the children were automatically to live with the father, the father would have sole decision-making authority, and the mother’s time and communication with the children would be suspended.

The mother appealed.

Does safety have determinative weight under s 60CC?

One of the mother’s grounds of appeal was that the primary judge had failed to give determinative weight to the promotion of safety under ss 60CC(2)(a) and 60CC(2A).

The Full Court rejected that argument.

The Court said that if the contention was that the promotion of safety must, as a matter of law, be given greater weight than the other considerations, that contention was misconceived.

Instead, referring to Pierce & Pierce (No 2), the Full Court confirmed that following the 2024 amendments, safety is a “focused starting point” in determining the parenting regime that best promotes the child’s best interests.

That distinction matters.

Section 60CC(2A) requires the Court, when considering the safety consideration in s 60CC(2)(a), to consider any history of family violence, abuse or neglect and any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child’s family.

But the legislation does not say that the safety consideration automatically determines the outcome.

Parenting decisions remain discretionary decisions based upon an assessment of the child’s best interests as a whole.

In this case, the Full Court was satisfied that the primary judge had considered the competing allegations of risk in detail. The primary judge had made findings about the history of family violence and the father’s perpetration of family violence, but had ultimately found that neither parent posed an unacceptable risk to the children.

The mother’s appeal on this ground therefore failed.

The therapy orders were a different story

The mother had more success in challenging the mandatory therapy regime.

The primary judge had ordered the mother to obtain psychological treatment concerning her mental health and, separately, treatment intended to assist her to accept the Court’s finding that the father did not pose an unacceptable risk to the children.

Non-compliance had an immediate and significant consequence: a reversal of the children’s living arrangements, transfer of decision-making authority to the father and suspension of the mother’s time and communication with the children.

The Full Court set aside Orders 32 to 34, 36 and 37.

There were two important problems with the regime.

Self-executing parenting orders

The first was the automatic change of care.

The orders meant that a failure to comply with therapy would itself trigger a fundamental change in the children’s parenting arrangements.

The Full Court concluded that the self-executing reversal of care was unreasonable and plainly wrong.

That is an important practical point.

A significant change in where children live should ordinarily involve consideration of their best interests in the circumstances existing at that time. An order which attempts to determine that future outcome automatically, based simply upon whether a parent complies with another order, can create serious difficulties.

Mandatory therapy and the limits of the parenting power

The second issue concerned the Court’s power to order the therapy itself.

The fact that the orders had been described as interim did not solve the problem.

The Full Court ultimately concluded that the relevant mandatory therapy orders were stand-alone orders which were not sufficiently tethered to a parenting order. They were therefore set aside. The Court’s own catchwords describe the therapy orders as “stand-alone orders untethered to a parenting order”.

This is an important distinction for practitioners.

The Court undoubtedly has broad powers when making parenting orders. Therapeutic intervention can also form an important part of parenting arrangements.

But there remains a difference between an order regulating parenting arrangements — including appropriate conditions connected with those arrangements — and a stand-alone direction compelling an adult to undertake therapeutic treatment.

Simply characterising an order as “interim” does not expand the statutory power available to the Court.

What does Lawrence & Stephanidi tell us?

There are two particularly useful lessons from the decision.

First, safety is central to the post-2024 parenting framework, but it is not a statutory trump card.

The promotion of safety is the focused starting point under s 60CC. It does not follow that it must receive determinative weight in every case. The Court must still undertake the evaluative exercise required by s 60CC and determine what orders are in the particular child’s best interests.

Second, practitioners should exercise caution when drafting therapeutic and self-executing parenting orders.

An order requiring therapy needs a proper statutory foundation and connection with the parenting orders being made. Calling it an interim order does not overcome a problem of power.

Similarly, an order providing for an automatic change of care following non-compliance should attract very careful scrutiny. In Lawrence & Stephanidi, the consequence of failing to comply with therapy was sufficiently significant that the Full Court characterised the resulting self-executing order as unreasonable and plainly wrong.

The takeaway

Lawrence & Stephanidi is an important decision about the operation of the amended s 60CC.

The promotion of safety is a focused starting point in determining a child’s best interests. It is not, however, automatically entitled to determinative weight over every other relevant consideration.

The decision is also a useful reminder that creative parenting orders still need to remain within the Court’s statutory power. Mandatory therapy cannot simply stand alone, and an automatic change of care triggered by non-compliance may not survive appellate scrutiny.

For family lawyers, the lesson is as much about drafting as it is about principle: identify the source of power, connect therapeutic conditions to the parenting order they support, and be very cautious about orders which attempt to predetermine a future change in a child’s care.